Optimal Law Enforcement and Victim Precaution
- 期刊名称The RAND Journal of Economics
- 作者Keith N. Hylton
- 卷第27卷
- 期第1期
- 印刷ISSN0741-6261
- 文件大小229.38KB
- 发表时间1996
- DOI10.2307/2555799
- 页码197-206
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