Three misconceptions concerning strong embodimentDempsey, Liam P.; Shani, Itay · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · 2015

Newtonian Idealism: Matter, Perception, and the Divine WillDempsey, Liam P. · The Southern Journal of Philosophy · 2014

Dynamical agents: Consciousness, causation, and two specters of epiphenomenalismLiam Dempsey; Itay Shani · 2009

John Locke, ‘Hobbist’: of sleeping souls and thinking matterDempsey, Liam P. · Canadian Journal of Philosophy · 2016

Stressing the Flesh: In Defense of Strong Embodied CognitionLIAM P. DEMPSEY; ITAY SHANI · 2012

Conscious experience, reduction and identity: many explanatory gaps, one solutionDempsey, Liam P. · Philosophical Psychology · 2004

Consciousness, Supervenience, and Identity: Marras and Kim on the Efficacy of Conscious ExperienceDEMPSEY, LIAM P. · Dialogue · 2012