Evolutionary dynamics may eliminate all strategies used in correlated equilibrium
- 作者Yannick Viossat
- 卷第56卷
- 期第1期
- 印刷ISSN0165-4896
- 文件大小402.29KB
- 发表时间2008
- DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2007.12.001
- 页码27-43
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