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A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR THE NON-EMPTINESS OF THE SOCIALLY STABLE CORE IN STRUCTURED TU-GAMES

A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR THE NON-EMPTINESS OF THE SOCIALLY STABLE CORE IN STRUCTURED TU-GAMES

CESCO, JUAN CARLOS
  • 期刊名称International Game Theory Review
  • 作者CESCO, JUAN CARLOS
  • 卷第11卷
  • 期第3期
  • 印刷ISSN0219-1989
  • 电子ISSN1793-6675
  • 文件大小151.99KB
  • 发表时间2009-09
  • DOI10.1142/s0219198909002376
  • 页码383-389
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