Belief dependence: How do the numbers count?
- 期刊名称Philosophical Studies
- 作者Barnett, Zach
- 印刷ISSN0031-8116
- 电子ISSN1573-0883
- 文件大小440.72KB
- 发表时间2017-12-9
- DOI10.1007/s11098-017-1016-0
A SENSELESS CONVERSATIONBarnett, Zach · Think · 2011
Conciliationism and merely possible disagreementBarnett, Zach; Li, Han · Synthese · 2016
Philosophy Without BeliefBarnett, Zach · Mind · 2017
Tolerance and the distributed soritesBarnett, Zach · Synthese · 2017
Rational Moral IgnoranceBarnett, Zach · Philosophy and Phenomenological Research · 2020
FOOL ME ONCE: CAN INDIFFERENCE VINDICATE INDUCTION?Barnett, Zach; Li, Han · Episteme · 2018
No free lunch: The significance of tiny contributionsBarnett, Zach · Analysis · 2018
Truthmaking, Recombination, and Facts OntologyFrank Hofmann · Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition · 2006
Policing the "Aufbau"David K. Lewis · Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition · 1969
Thought and Thought ExperimentsDavid Cole · Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition · 1984
Emotivism and Truth ConditionsDaniel Stoljar · Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition · 1993
Two Concepts of ConsciousnessDavid M. Rosenthal · Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition · 1986
Becoming and PersonsRonald C. Hoy · Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition · 1978
Conceivability, Explanation, and DefeatGordon Barnes · Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition · 2002
Strong and Weak PossibilityJason Turner · Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition · 2005